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The evolution of the concepts used in a treaty does not 
necessarily imply that protection of general interests in the 
international community will be strengthened. 1 
. .. the interpretation of treaties is an art rather than a 
science . .. the process of interpretation must begin and end with 
the actual text to be interpreted. 2 
... the international system makes law through multiple 
processes and in multiple settings... The problem for the 
international lawyer in the short term is to develop a method for 
identifying and properly characterizing the different forms of law, 
identifying those fora in which one or the other is likely to be 
deemed dispositive, assessing the projected implementability of 
particular normative statements in different situations, and using 
the terms accurately and responsibly.3 
1. CONTRACT V. TREATY 'NECESSITY': REGULATORY 
FLEXIBILITY AND MORAL HAZARD 
International treaties express binding sovereign decisions to 
regulate State conduct, in a manner that has some analogies4 
1. Giorgio Gaja, The Protection of General Interests in the International Community: 
General Course on Public International Law (2011), in 364 RECUEIL DES COURS: 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2012, at 9, 66 
(2014). 
2. RY. Jennings, The Law of Treaties: General Course on Principles of International 
Law, in 121 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 544 (1967). 
3. W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International 
Law-Making Processes and the Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw IN TREATY MAKING 15, 26, 29 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Volker Raben eds., 
2005). 
4. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAw SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 3-6 (1927) (explaining the point of contact private contract law has 
with international public law, and positing that while there is a close relation between the 
two branches, there are also problems with analogizing private law and international 
public law). 
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- but also "glaring institutional differences"5 - with the pure 
system of private contract. Much like ordinary contracts, treaties 
seek to define the terms of performance of the States parties to 
these agreements, but treaties cannot fully anticipate every 
situation of deviance. Unlike ordinary contracts, however, 
treaties are concluded through the direct exercise of sovereign 
power, with States concluding such treaties undertaking to be 
internationally responsible to fellow State parties to a treaty, and 
in some instances, also to non-State parties. While an ordinary 
contract breach triggers a private cause of action for liability, a 
treaty breach gives rise to an international claim. In its Judgment 
on Jurisdiction in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, the 
International Court of Justice pointedly stressed the strict 
differences between treaties concluded by States, and 
international or cross-border concession contracts concluded by 
governments and foreign corporations: 
The Court cannot accept the view that the contract 
signed between the Iranian Government and the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company has a double character. It is 
nothing more than a concessionary contract between a 
government and a foreign corporation. The United 
Kingdom Government is not a party to the contract; 
there is no privity of contract between the Government 
of Iran and the Government of the United Kingdom. 
Under the contract the Iranian Government cannot 
claim from the United Kingdom Government any rights 
which it may claim from the Company, nor can it be 
called upon to perform towards the United Kingdom 
Government any obligations which it is bound to perform 
towards the Company. The document bearing the 
signatures of the representatives of the Iranian 
Government and the Company has a single purpose: the 
purpose of regulating the relations between that 
Government and the Company in regard to the 
5. See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 120 
(2008) (explaining that, as opposed to a contract, a "treaty lacks the type of normal 
domestic court of compulsory and universal jurisdiction, with the ability to levy damages 
and order performance"). 
718 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38:3 
concession. It does not regulate in any way the relations 
between the two Governments.6 
There are thus some conceptual limits to how far we can 
analogize contractual privity and contractual remedies to reshape 
our understanding of sovereign political authority and how this 
authority, in turn, informs the parameters of State conduct 
described in the design and interpretation of treaties. 7 There are 
limits to how far we can successfully and effectively extract and 
transpose the practical experiences and interpretive mandates of 
regime-specific centralized institutions that regularly navigate 
public policy and private interest tensions, such as in World 
Trade Organization (WTO) law, into another regime's atomized 
hybridity of treaties and disperse constellation of enforcement 
and compliance mechanisms (such as in international investment 
law).8 These limits do not, however, rob private law or contract 
law analogies of analytical value when one assesses the 
continuing development of 'postmodern' international law,9 
6. Anglo·Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 93, 
112 (July 22); see also Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits 
to 'The Limits of International Law', 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 289, 306-07 (2006) ("It is perfectly 
possible to outline testable hypotheses not only concerning the effectiveness of 
treaties. . .. If the explanatory power of a rationalist approach to IL is used for 
institutional design on an international plane, an analysis well founded in IL doctrine 
together with a differentiated analysis of states' incentives to comply is necessary. 
[However], one might question the application to moral issues of the rational choice 
approach as this stretches rational choice beyond its proper scope."). 
7. See Friedrich Kratochwil, The Limits of Contract, 5 EUR. J. INT'LL. 465, 466 (1994) 
("[C]onsiderably more than consent is required in order to explain the emergence of 
political authority and obligation. Contrary to the belief that what matters is the 
exchange, I shall argue that it does matter what we exchange and that, therefore, the 
farther we move from spot exchanges in a market to more complex social arrangements, 
the less is explained by the institution of contract as opposed to other elements."). 
8. See Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: 
Community Expectations and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT'L L. 51, 52-55 
(2014) (explaining there are fundamentally different economic principles distinguishing 
international trade regimes from investment regimes and positing that while there is a 
straightforward transactional linkage between trade and investment, the conceptual 
differences between the two has resulted in the regimes having different international 
regulatory structures). 
9. See generally Andreas L. Paulus, International Law After Postmodernism: 
Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 727, 731, 748, 
755 (2001) (analyzing the subjective nature of postmodern legal analysis and its 
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particularly vivid in the hybrid public-private domain of foreign 
investment contracts and their complex relationship with 
bilateral or regional investment treaties.lO International 
investment law - as created from the exploding mass of 
cross-border investment treaties, foreign investment contracts, 
national legislation, and investor-State arbitral jurisprudence 
harnessing multiple sources of international law and domestic 
law - admittedly generates many complex intersections between 
the law of contract and the law of treaties. 11 It is in this light that 
importance in saving international law from politics and irrelevance); TAI·HENG CHENG, 
WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 45 (2012) (describing postmodern international law as 
a reflection of uncertainty about basic values, and uncertainty over whether international 
law ultimately controls outcomes); MARIO PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 4, 6-7 (2012) (detailing the roots of 'postmodern anxiety' for 
international lawyers due to the expansion of international law to more subjects, actors, 
institutions, and treaties). 
10. Among the scores of works examining the hybridity of investment law and the 
interplay of contract and treaty law in this regime, see Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private 
in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 367, 
406-07 (2014) (pointing out that contemporary international investment law allows for 
treaty-based claims, contract-based claims, and statute-based claims, with treaty-based 
claims originating in public international law, contract-based claims most often calling for 
the application of private international law, and statute-based claims having the potential 
to implicate either public or private international law); William W. Burke-White & 
Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review 
in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283, 287-88 (2010) (arguing that 
traditional commercial arbitration, seen in a private law context and used largely to settle 
contractual disputes, is now best understood in a public rather than private law context 
after the rise of investment treaty arbitration with the proliferation of BITs in the 1990s); 
Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE 607, 608-09 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010) (explaining that the 
international investment regime entails bilateral and regional investment agreements, 
which include both trade and investment provisions, as well as rules contained in 
multinational agreements designed for purposes other than international investment). 
11. See Christian J. Tams, The Sources of International Investment Law: Concluding 
Thoughts, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 319, 319, 322 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De 
Brabandere eds., 2012) (commenting that questions of sources tend to be complex in 
international law and, in evaluating sources of international investment law, that 
investment law is regulated by multilateral treaties or particular rules governed by 
international laws such as for investment contracts); Florian Grisel, The Sources of 
Foreign Investment Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 213, 
213-14 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014) (highlighting the difficulty of identifying the 
source of foreign investment law before detailing the World Bank's enactment of 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, which was derived from 
720 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W [Vol. 38:3 
one vastly appreciates Professor Alan Sykes' Economic 'Necessity' 
in International Law,12 which contributes to sovereign treaty 
makers' rational design and ongoing reform of international 
economic treaty language in a manner that would enable States 
to adjust and respond to economic emergencies without incurring 
the exorbitant costs of foreign investor compensation. 
At the same time, however, it is also important to draw some 
caveats as to how far international adjudicators could realistically 
apply Professor Sykes' prescriptions ex post, particularly to 
pre-existing or current investment treaties that do not possess the 
linguistic elasticity that could enable Professor Sykes' proposed a 
priori interpretation of necessity clauses in these treaties. 13 As I 
have shown elsewhere, the doctrinal genealogy of the 
international law of necessity - the Janus counterpart of the 
theory of international obligation 14 - reveals frequent oscillations 
in language and meaning throughout State practice and treaty 
usage, with the classical form of necessity often invoked to enable 
sovereigns to repudiate any international responsibility.15 To 
deliberately veer away from this classical understanding of the 
international law of necessity as a broad, self-judging, and 
overriding exception in international law, the International Law 
multilateral agreements, bilateral investment treaties, national investment codes, and 
laws drawn from arbitral awards); see also Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Of Contracts and 
Treaties in the Global Market, in 8 MAx PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAw 341, 
357 (Armin von Bogdandy & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2004) ("[T]reaties and contracts, albeit 
different, pursue the same objective of ensuring the rule of law and the observance of legal 
commitments in the international community and are thus called to increasing 
interaction. To this end, treaties are becoming privatized by allowing a greater role for 
individuals in their operation, just as contracts are becoming public to the extent that 
states and international law extend their guarantees to their observance."). 
12. Alan O. Sykes, Economic "Necessity" in International Law, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 
296 (2015). 
13. See id. at 319·21 (examining the use of the necessity defense in international 
investment cases and introducing approaches to effective implementation of the necessity 
defense in light of current investment treaty language). 
14. See DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES 48 
(2012) ("Early attempts to codify the law of international responsibility have always 
included a 'necessity' dimension."). 
15. See id. at 2 (stating that because States use the law of necessity as one way to 
alter their duty to comply with treaty obligations, their assertions of necessity have tended 
to oscillate between doctrinal order and anarchy). 
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Commission (lLC) deliberately placed such stringent conditions 
to its use only as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness under 
Article 25 of the Articles of State Responsibility, entitling States 
invoking this circumstance to temporarily suspend (and not 
reject) their performance of international obligations. 16 The 
International Court of Justice also supported this restrictive 
codification, with the Court declaring in its 1997 Judgment in the 
Gabcikouo-Nagymaros case that the ILC formulation is 
"reflect[ive] of customary law."17 It is quite understandable that 
the United Nations' principal judicial organ (the International 
Court of Justice)18 restricted its acceptance of the international 
law of necessity based on the recommendations of the U.N. 
General Assembly's designated research and international law 
codification body (the ILC),19 as a mere circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness and not an overriding exception, when one 
considers that the international law of necessity gained so much 
of its currently stringent doctrinal contours from States' 
historically repeated attempts to excuse, justify, or mitigate 
treaty breaches.20 The modern international system created 
under the United Nations Charter purposely rejected any 
16. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
N56/1O, at 80 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles] (limiting the use of the necessity 
doctrine to situations meeting a narrow set of conditions, in order to prevent a State's 
abuse of the necessity invocation). 
17. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.lSlovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 
~~ 49, 51-52 (Sept. 25); see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Necessity in International 
Environmental Law, 41 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 159, 162-63 (2010) (commenting on Article 
25's requirements to use the necessity doctrine and positing that the ICJ's judgment in 
this case indicates that Article 25's conditions reflect customary international law). I have 
argued in previous work, however, that though the Court's thin declaration that the basic 
conditions stated in ILC draft article 33 (currently reproduced in the elements of ILC 
Article 25) "reflect customary international law," the Court did so without citing to state 
practice, judicial decision, or other authorities except for the ILC's draft formulation. 
DESIERTO, supra note 14, at 110-11. 
18. U.N. Charter art. 92. 
19. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), at 105 (Nov. 21, 1947) (establishing the ILC); ILC Draft 
Articles, supra note 16, art. 25 (stating the ILC's restrictions on the law of necessity). 
20. See Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally 
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 10-12 (2000) (highlighting cases that 
show States' pleas of necessity as an excuse for noncompliance with a treaty, which 
ultimately resulted in the ILC codifying the concept's contours). 
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unfettered meaning of sovereignty that enshrines any State's 
unlimited authority to act in the international sphere without 
regard to its responsibility to the international community of 
States.21 A broad and self-judged international legal doctrine of 
necessity, if left untamed and unrestrained, could easily justify 
- if not incentivize any State to take internationally 
irresponsible unilateral actions that violate duties of general 
cooperation mandated under the Charter.22 
At its doctrinal baseline, therefore, the postmodern 
international law on necessity should be seen to operate 
restrictively only as a 'safety valve'23 mechanism that enables 
21. See BARDO FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 111·12 (2009): 
Sovereignty today cannot mean unlimited freedom of action of states in the 
international sphere as this would be incompatible with the very idea of an 
international legal order .... At the San Francisco Conference, 'sovereign 
equality' of states (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter) was deliberately 
adopted as a 'new term'. It is 'sovereign equality', not 'equal sovereignty' the 
Charter speaks of. The purpose of the new expression was clear: The idea of 
equality of states in law was given precedence over that of sovereignty by 
relegating the latter to the position of an attributive adjective merely 
modifying the noun 'equality'. In this combination, sovereignty was meant to 
exclude the legal superiority of anyone state over another, but not a greater 
role played by the international community vis-a.-vis all its members .... [I]n 
the system instituted by the Charter a state's right to independence is 
qualified by an obligation to promote and protect common values of the 
community. 
(footnotes omitted). 
22. See DESIERTO, supra note 14, at 317 (noting that the doctrine of necessity could 
"provoke greater moral hazards from States that might invoke unilateral humanitarian 
interventions as a pretext to use force for coercive or aggressive purposes"); Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, 11 EUR. 
J. INT'LL. 19, 22 (2000) (highlighting the general obligation to cooperate found in the U.N. 
Charter). 
23. See DESIERTO, supra note 14, at 23 (describing the doctrine of necessity as "better 
seen as a 'safety valve'" in modern times); Ian Johnstone, The Plea of ''Necessity'' in 
International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 339 (2005) (stating that the law of necessity is a "safety 
valve" by which States can escape the harmful consequences of having to comply with the 
law's requirements); Maria Agius, The Invocation of Necessity in International Law, 56 
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 95, 134 (2009) (declaring that necessity must never be used as a 
justification to indefinitely act contrary to international law); Julio Barboza, Necessity 
(Revisited) in International Law, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw IN HONOUR OF JUDGE 
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States to avail of a temporary respite from performing their 
international obligations. At the same time, however, there is 
nothing that prevents States from designing a necessity provision 
in a treaty that operates well beyond this baseline to enlarge the 
space for justified treaty noncompliance by States. When treaty 
parties assert that such a broader necessity provision is provided 
for in a treaty, it behooves international tribunals tasked with 
evaluating the asserted broader interpretation, to examine the 
actual nature of the treaty text and context, as well as discern the 
systemic policy implications to treaty regime participants if such 
broader exculpatory consequences are read into any alleged 
treaty-defined necessity clause, in a manner that supposedly 
creates for any State party to the treaty an a priori overriding 
exception against the institutionalized web of obligations and 
rights contemplated in these specialized treaty regimes.24 
Any more expansive reading of the international law of 
necessity stands to undermine the cornerstone international legal 
principle of pacta sunt seruanda,25 where States' duties to perform 
MANFRED LACHS 27. 29 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1984) (quoting an ILC Report which 
stated that the law of necessity must be prevented except in cases where it may be used 
as a "safety valve" to allow States a means of escape from complying with laws that would 
result in harmful consequences). 
24. See Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State 
Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT'LL. 447, 451 (2012): 
[N]ecessity [should) be reoriented to facilitate and incentivize a more 
transparent appraisal of the competing interests, policies, and values that will 
virtually always be at stake, at least implicitly, in those international disputes 
in which necessity is pleaded .... In contemporary international law, the plea 
of necessity instead requires a contextual inquiry into, and candid 
consultation of, the unavoidable trade-offs among the often incommensurable 
interests, policies, and values embedded in international law .... 
25. Pacta Sunt Servanda is defined as a principle in international law that means 
agreements must be kept. Pacta Sunt Servanda Law & Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, 
http://definitions.uslegal.comfp/pacta-sunt-servandal (last visited Feb. 19, 2016); see also, 
e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.lSlovk.), Judgment, 1997 LC.J. Rep. 7, 8 
(Sept. 25) (illustrating the implementation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda); 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 LC.J. Rep. 14, ~ 270 (June 27) ("[I)fthere is a duty of a State not to impede the due 
performance of a treaty to which it is a party, that is not a duty imposed by the treaty 
itself .... [T)his is a duty arising under customary international law independently of the 
treaty, ... it is implicit in the rule pacta sunt servanda."); Johnstone, supra note 23, at 
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treaty obligations in good faith also includes a heavy presumption 
against the existence of any right of unilateral termination of a 
treaty.26 Unlike domestic jurisdictions operating with more 
vertical enforcement systems, the operation of international law 
under a more ambiguity-laden "horizontal legal order"27 with a 
very decentralized enforcement system inevitably lends itself to 
incidents of State noncompliance with international law. 28 
Because a much broader scope to the postmodern international 
law of necessity inherently escalates the ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of treaty obligations, authoritative 
decision-makers and treaty appliers in international law should 
be deemed - as part of their international duty to give a decision 
in all circumstances avoiding a non liquet in internationallaw29 -
to also assume a correspondingly stricter onus to elaborate their 
reasoning, rather than merely deferring to a State's self-judged, 
broader, classical understanding and use of necessity in 
international disputes. 
Moreover, an international tribunal's analysis of the meaning 
and operation of asserted exceptions, such as economic necessity, 
339 (stating that the law of necessity is a means by which States can escape having to 
comply with a law's requirements). 
26. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLTj (establishing that every treaty must be performed in 
good faith); LORD MCNAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIES 493-94 (1986) (elaborating on the normal 
basis approach that a treaty "is intended to be of perpetual duration and incapable of 
unilateral termination"). 
27. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How WE 
USE IT 1 (1995). 
28. See Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 
YALE J. INT'L L. 189, 190-91 (2006) (stating that international law's structure makes it 
difficult to enforce laws at a sophisticated level, which sometimes results in operational 
noncompliance); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 
175, 188 (1993) (identifying various factors that account for States' violations of treaties: 
"(1) ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language, (2) limitations on the capacity of 
parties to carry out their undertakings, and (3) the temporal dimension of the social and 
economic changes contemplated by regulatory treaties"). 
29. See Non Liquet, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "non liquet" 
as a situation where the applicable law is unclear); Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, Non Liquet: 
From Modern Law to Roman Law, 10 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMPo L. 1, 10 (2010) 
(asserting that in modern legal systems, a judge has a duty to adjudicate, and the principle 
rejecting instances of non liquet applies to international law). 
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also has to be undertaken according to the parameters of the 
tribunal's jurisdiction and the nature of the relief that the 
tribunal is authorized to grant to the disputing parties. Thus, in 
Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v. Greece), while the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) recognized the 
binding legal force of international arbitral awards finding that 
Greece was responsible to pay the Belgian company bondholders 
after Greece defaulted on its sovereign bonds during the 1932 
financial crisis, the PCIJ nevertheless purposely refrained from 
ruling on the issue of Greece's capacity to pay its debt as being 
outside the scope of its jurisdiction.3o On the other hand in the 
Brazilian Loans case, while the Court held that "the economic 
dislocation caused by the Great War [World War I] has not, in 
legal principle, released the Brazilian Government from its 
obligations,"31 the Court chose to pay "utmost regard" to the 
jurisprudence of French courts in order to ultimately determine 
the law governing the applicable currency (gold francs) for 
payment of Brazil's sovereign debts.32 Similarly in the Serbian 
Loans case, the Court again held firm against releasing the 
Serbian Government from sovereign debt obligations despite the 
financial hardship of the World War I, although it conceded that 
such hardship could play its own role in the equities of 
30. As noted in Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), Judgment, 1939 
P.C.I.J. (ser. AlB) No. 78, at 177-78 (June 15): 
Nor could submission No.4 ofthe Greek Government be entertained if it were 
regarded as a plea in defence designed to obtain from the Court a declaration 
in law to the effect that the Greek Government is justified, owing to force 
majeure, in not executing the awards as formulated. For it is clear that the 
Court could only make such a declaration after having itself verified that the 
alleged financial situation really exists and after having ascertained the effect 
which the execution of the awards in full would have on that situation; in fact, 
the Parties are in agreement that the question of Greece's capacity to pay is 
outside the scope of the proceedings before the Court. 
31. Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (Fr. v. Braz.), 
Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15, at 120 (July 12). 
32. See id. at 97-98, 124-25 (detailing that the Court must pay the "utmost regard" 
to the decisions of the French courts, because their jurisprudence aids in determining the 
rules applicable to the issue of how the payment of Brazilian bonds is affected by the 
reduction in the metallic value of the French franc). 
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international sovereign debt negotiations outside the purview of 
the Court: 
It cannot be maintained that the war itself, despite its 
grave economic consequences, affected the legal 
obligations of the contracts between the Serbian 
Government and the French bondholders. The economic 
dislocations caused by the war did not release the debtor 
State, although they may present equities which 
doubtless will receive appropriate consideration in the 
negotiations .... 33 
Years later in the Gabcikouo-Nagymaros case, the PCIJ's 
successor court, the International Court of Justice, inferred that 
even if it had been established that there was a state of necessity 
that impeded Hungary from performing its infrastructure 
obligations under the 1977 Treaty with Czechoslovakia, the 
evidence before the Court already showed that "Hungary would 
not have been permitted to rely upon that state of necessity in 
order to justify its failure to comply with its treaty obligations, as 
it had helped, by act or omission, to bring it about."34 At that 
point, the Court observed judicial parsimony and purposely chose 
not to rule on and decide other questions related to the state of 
necessity, such as whether Hungary impaired an essential 
interest of Czechoslovakia and whether alleged Czechoslovakian 
breaches of the 1977 Treaty also contributed to the state of 
necessity.35 
States have every reason to be wary of the moral hazard 
potential of necessity defenses, but it does not prevent them from 
including provisions on necessity in modern international 
treaties, to vindicate various policy objectives, such as to: 
1) maintain treaty legality or applicability even in exceptional 
situations; 2) permit the State invoking necessity to modify its 
mode of treaty compliance during the state of necessity or 
emergency; 3) prevent abusive or disingenuous invocations of the 
33. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Kingdom of the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20/21, at 39-40 (July 12). 
34. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.lSlovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ~ 57 
(Sept. 25). 
35. Id. ~ 58. 
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state of necessity by other treaty parties; and 4) restore treaty 
performance immediately after the termination of the exceptional 
situation.36 States choose to incorporate these clauses purposely 
to regulate the conduct of parties to treaties during situations of 
necessity.37 These choices can yield both productive potential for 
enabling flexibility and adaptation to economic crises, as well as 
perils of ambiguity that incentivizes States' morally hazardous 
conduct. As shown in Part II (Controlling Compensation 
Consequences of Necessity in Investment Treaties), Professor 
Sykes presents various rational choice theory-based innovations 
to the design of future necessity clauses especially for 
international economic treaties, which certainly resonate with 
many current global and scholarly initiatives (including my own) 
for reform and further development of international investment 
treaties and the reparations consequences arising from breach of 
investment treaties.38 However, as discussed in Part III (Limits 
36. Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and "Supplementary Means of Interpretation" for 
Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 827, 833 
(2010). 
37. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAw OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 377-78 (2d ed. 
2015) (providing examples of when "investment treaties contain provisions that except 
contracting parties from core treaty obligations under exceptional circumstances in which 
a country's important national interests are at stake," such as the bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT) between the United States and Argentina, which states: "This Treaty shall 
not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of 
public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security 
interests."). 
38. See Sykes, supra note 12, at 310-11 (discussing various strategies for investors 
to eliminate all inefficient risk and how to contract for express exception to primary 
obligations). Note that Professor Sykes' position on temporary suspension of compensation 
owed by host States to investors during economic crises is similar to that of other authors 
who have previously considered or presented similar proposals for suspension of 
compensation. See, e.g., Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, The Interpretation of Necessity Clauses 
in Bilateral Investment Treaties After the Recent ICSID Annulment Decisions, in 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw & POLICY 2010-2011, at 419,420 (Karl P. 
Sauvant ed., 2012) ("The justification offered by the [necessity] clause is temporary and 
compensation is not, in principle, owed to investors during the given crisis, but some form 
of indemnity can exist in certain cases even if the BIT necessity clause is successfully 
invoked."); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 386 (2008) (stating that 
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to Reinterpreting Investment Treaty-Based Necessity), it is not 
at all easy, advisable, or otherwise legitimate under the 
methodological disciplines of treaty interpretation, to simply 
infuse Professor Sykes' rational choice and contract theory 
proposals into the "art and science" of the unitary system of 
interpretation established in the precis of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),39 especially when one 
has to consider the jurisdictional confines of disputes involving 
"NPM clauses raise two important questions with respect to state liability under a BIT," 
the first being "whether NPM clauses actually relieve states of responsibility, liability, and 
the duty to pay compensation for acts that would otherwise breach a BIT," and, second, 
assuming an NPM clause does relieve a state of liability, the period of time for which the 
NPM clause should be "deemed to apply and liability remain precluded"); Avidan Kent & 
Alexandra R. Harrington, The Plea of Necessity Under Customary International Law: A 
Critical Review in Light of the Argentine Cases, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAw 
AND ARBITRATION 246, 262 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) ("A second possible 
direction is that the right to compensation will only be suspended, and, therefore will 
remain actionable at some point in the future."). 
39. Article 31 of the VCLT has a canonical status both as a matter oftreaty law and 
customary international law. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. 
Belg.), Judgment, Preliminary Objections, 2004 LC.J. Rep. 279, ~ 100 (Dec. 15) (stating 
that the court would proceed "in accordance with customary international laws reflected 
in [VCLT] Article 31"); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 LC.J. Rep. 465, ~ 99 
(June 27) (stating that the court would proceed "in accordance with customary 
international law, reflected in [VCLT] Article 31"); Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 
Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ~ 41 (Feb. 3) (''The Court would recall that, in accordance 
with customary international law, reflected in [VCLT] Article 31 ... , a treaty must be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."); KasikililSedudu Island 
(Bots.lNamib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1044, ~ 18 (Dec. 13) ("As regards the 
interpretation of that Treaty, the Court notes that neither Botswana nor Namibia are 
parties to the [VCLT], but that both of them consider that [VCLT] Article 31 ... is 
applicable inasmuch as it reflects customary international law. The Court itself has 
already had occasion in the past to hold that customary international law found expression 
in [VCLT] Article 31 .... "); Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 
Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 5, ~ 41 (Feb. 3) ("The Court would recall that, in accordance 
with customary international law, reflected in [VCLT] Article 31 ... , a treaty must be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Interpretation must be based 
above all upon the text of the treaty."); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, Preliminary 
Objections, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 802, ~ 23 (Dec. 12) (''The Court recalls that, according to 
customary international law as expressed in [VCLT] Article 31 ... , a treaty must be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."). 
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the interpretation of current "necessity clauses" in treaties 
pending before international tribunals. Neither would it be 
automatically intuitive or interpretively acceptable to graft 
meanings of necessity derived from the practice of other 
international economic tribunals (such as the WTO) as the 
controlling interpretation writ large for all kinds of 
individually-formulated necessity clauses in international 
investment treaties,40 lacking any established nexus between 
provisions of these treaties from various international economic 
regimes, and absent the establishment of the same institutional, 
political, and judicial organs that enable centralized, repeat, and 
final adjudication and interpretation in world trade law.41 
Emulating the path of the deadlocked political organs42 and 
40. See Kathleen Claussen, The Casualty of Investor Protection in Times of Economic 
Crisis, 118 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-53 (2009) (finding that while international trade law and 
international investment law may harbor some shared language, each field developed 
separately from the other in a way that does not justify equating GAIT Article XX with 
the 'necessity provision' in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT); Desierto, supra note 36, 
at 882-84, 886, 892-93 (critiquing the arbitral tribunal's sudden transposition of GATT 
Article XX into the narrow language of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT). 
41. However, as a matter of legal phenomena, international investment law norms 
are increasingly found in more of the recent regional trade agreements. For example, see 
Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International 
Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 87 (2014): 
[S]ome of the jurisprudence developed in international trade law as well as 
the discourse concomitant with these changes can serve as a form of blueprint 
for a future system of international investment law that takes these concerns 
seriously. The current system, having focused on individual rights, can evolve 
into one that takes contrasting societal goals seriously, while anchoring its 
collective interpretative exercise in the texts of existing investment 
agreements. 
See also Tomer Broude, Toward an Economic Approach to the Consolidation of 
International Trade Regulation and International Investment Law, 9 JERUSALEM REV. 
LEGAL STUD. 24, 24 (2014) (analyzing Professor Jiirgen Kurtz's study of "the evolving 
relationship between international trade law and international investment law"). 
Whether or not the incorporation of trade law norms is the desired or ideal policy for 
investment law, however, is another matter. See Desierto, supra note 8, at 56 (cautioning 
against a mechanistic design of public policy solutions in international investment law by 
"mere transplant of the public policy interpretations, methodological approaches, and 
institutional solutions that have uniquely evolved within international trade law"). 
42. See Manfred Elsig & Cedric Dupont, Persistent Deadlock in Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations: The Case of Doha, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 587, 588-89 (Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012) (recalling that "[d]ifferent 
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criticized adjudicative organs,43 the WTO system may not 
necessarily yield the best system either for building in the treaty 
adaptation and regulatory flexibility needed by States in times of 
economic emergencies,44 even if the combined use of trade and 
investment remedies admittedly expands the types of relief 
ordinarily available to private litigants.45 The Conclusion (The 
Future of Economic Necessity in International Law) highlights 
the structural and compensatory innovations introduced by 
Professor Sykes as possible bases for future research for 
reforming the post-liability dimensions of investor-Sta te disputes, 
as well as for rethinking the next generations of bilateral and 
regional investment treaties and investment chapters in the 
emerging behemoth clusters of economic partnerships and trade 
agreements, such as the proposed investment chapter in the 
pending Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership46 and 
expressions have been used along the way to give meaning to the difficulties in progressing 
in negotiations," such as persistent deadlock). 
43. See, e.g., William Magnuson, WTO Jurisprudence & Its Critiques: The Appellate 
Body's Anti-Constitutional Resistance, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 121, 122 (2010) 
(arguing that the Appellate Body's "excessive use of narrow textualist argument tends to 
lead to short-sighted decisions that give little guidance[,] ... [that its] decisions have 
increasingly interfered with sensitive democratic processes in sovereign countries[, and 
that] the opinions handed down by the [Appellate Body] have led countries to adopt 
trade-restrictive, rather than trade-liberalizing, measures"). 
44. See Robert Howse & Efraim Chalamish, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in 
Investor-State Arbitration: A Reply to Jiirgen Kurtz, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1087, 1088 (2010) 
("Yet, any attempt to merge trade and investment jurisprudence should not ignore the 
unique characteristics of the investment law regime. While the multilateral trading 
system can be described as centralized through its negotiation process and unified dispute 
settlement system with a final judicial instance, the investment field is much more 
diffused, both in terms of proliferation of investment treaties with various texts and 
multiple arbitral tribunals, which, using Kurtz's own words, 'prioritizes party autonomy, 
speed, and finality over the process of legal reasoning and justification' .... "). 
45. See Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 43 (2015) ("It is worth noting that private interests can rely on 
importation and cross-fertilization [between international trade and investment law] 
without worrying too much about the long-term consequences for resulting case law."). 
46. See EU to Pursue the Most Ambitious Sustainable Development, Labour and 
Environment Provisions in TTIP, EUR. COMMISSION (Nov. 6, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa. 
euldoclib/pressfindex.cfm?id=1393 (describing ongoing EU proposals for sustainable 
development and environmental provisions). 
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recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership and its investment 
chapter.47 
II. CONTROLLING COMPENSATION CONSEQUENCES OF 
NECESSITY IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 
Professor Sykes points out several lessons from other legal 
regimes that contain a doctrine of necessity. From the standpoint 
of tort law, he states: "necessity's purpose is to enable an actor to 
avoid a greater harm either by causing a lesser harm at the 
expense of the plaintiff or by violating an otherwise applicable 
legislative enactment ... acts of necessity are efficient acts."48 
Moral hazard concerns that individuals will take risks that 
benefit them but result in socially dangerous consequences can be 
remedied in various ways: 1) by imposing a compensation 
requirement that forces the defendant to internalize the costs of 
the act;49 2) preventing the defendant from availing of the 
privilege of acting out of necessity if he or she contributed to or 
otherwise authored the situation of necessity;50 or 3) designing a 
liability rule that exempts the individual actor from liability if his 
or her act of necessity ultimately protects social interests and 
yields greater social benefits than costS.51 From the perspective of 
contract law, Professor Sykes enumerates other useful 
considerations, such as: 1) the concept of expectation damages 
that facilitates efficient deviation from commitments in response 
to economic exigencies (e.g. "if the costs of performance to a 
promisor exceed the value of performance to the promisee, 
performance is socially inefficient. With a rule of expectation 
damages in place, and neglecting complications associated with 
litigation and error costs, a rational promisor will breach and pay 
damages if breach is efficient."), assuming that computing 
compensation is "less costly or error prone";52 2) renegotiating an 
47. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, ch. 9, https:/lustr.gov/sitesfdefault/filestrPP-
Final-Text-Investment. pdf. 
48. Sykes, supra note 12, at 298. 
49. Id. at 299. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 300. 
52. Id. 
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incomplete contract where the default remedy available against 
the defendant is only specific performance;53 or 3) applying 
impossibility or commercial impracticability doctrines, which, 
while generally inefficient in application, may be the "optimal 
contractual response [depending] not only on the efficiency of 
performance but also on the parties' attitudes toward risk."54 
Several of the foregoing proposals pointed out by Professor 
Sykes are already present in certain areas of international 
investment law. However, many rigidities remain in the 
application of these proposals to situations of economic emergency 
faced by the host State to an investment. Liquidated damages 
clauses in foreign investment contracts, for example, purposely 
make host States internalize the costs of deliberately breaching 
guaranteed protections to investors, without regard for the 
State's assertion of regulatory prerogative or the existence of an 
economic emergency. 55 A liquidated damages clause for a State's 
breach of its foreign investment contract often 
constitutes an amount agreed between the parties that 
is due without any obligation on the injured party to 
quantify its loss or damage[, which] ... can significantly 
reduce political risk, by eliminating the uncertainty 
involved in any tribunal's quantification of harm and the 
mustering of evidence on quantum of damages. The 
parties should, however, pay close attention to the 
compatibility of liquidated damages with the law 
applicable to the merits ofthe dispute.56 
Liquidated damages clauses do not lend themselves to 
functional adaptability and liability mitigation that may be more 
socially equitable in the case of a host State contending with an 
economIC emergency. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 301. 
55. MODEL PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AND TANZANIA PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
AND ABC LTD FOR ANY AREA, arts. I2(a), 26(i) (2013), http://www.tpdc-tz.comlModel% 
20Production%20Sharing%20Agreement%20(2013).pdf. 
56. NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL 
RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 59-60 (2005). 
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Even if a liquidated damages clause in a foreign investment 
contract could potentially put a fixed cap to the damages a host 
State is liable to pay an investor for deliberate breach of contract 
during an economic emergency, it is not a guarantee that the host 
State would be automatically insulated from any further 
compensatory liability. Investors' investment treaty-based claims 
are separate from pure foreign investment contract breach 
claims. When a host State is shown to have breached investment 
protection guarantees in an investment treaty (such as standards 
on non-discrimination, national treatment, most favored nation 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and 
security, among others), the host State's breach of its investment 
treaty obligations gives rise to investors' rights to reparations for 
the breach,57 as a result of arbitral tribunals' formulaic invocation 
of the Chorzow Factory definition of reparations. 58 In determining 
57. As noted in JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT 397 (2013): 
Tribunals have arrived at this conclusion by finding that customary 
international law applies to the question of liability and compensation. In 
particular, they have relied on Chorz6w Factory, in which the Permanent 
Court of International Justice stated that, according to customary 
international law, if a state has committed a wrong it is liable to pay 
reparations. The amount of such reparations must be sufficient to eliminate 
the consequences of the illegal act and to place the wronged party in the 
situation it would have been had the illegal act not taken place .... [H]aving 
determined the liability of the host state for violating a treaty treatment 
standard, an arbitral tribunal will next determine the compensation to be paid 
to the investor by comparing its actual situation after the breach with the 
situation it would have been in had no breach taken place. Through its 
decision on the amount of an award to be paid by the offending state, the 
tribunal will seek to place the injured investor in the same financial situation 
it would have been had no breach occurred. 
(footnotes omitted). 
58. See Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.9, at 
21 (July 26) ("Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply 
a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself."). I 
scrutinize this almost automatic - and largely uncritical- resort by investor-State arbitral 
tribunals to the Chorz6w Factory standard in Diane A. Desierto, Choice and 
Proportionality in Chorzow: The Outer Limits of 'Adequate' Reparations for Breaches of 
Investment Treaties' Non-Expropriation Provisions (work in progress) (on file with author) 
(for presentation at the Jan. 30, 2016 Institute of Transnational Arbitration Academic 
Council Works-in-Progress Workshop in Washington D.C.). 
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the quantum of compensation due for a State's investment treaty 
breaches, arbitral tribunals have been critiqued for their 
imprecision, opacity, and at times, seeming arbitrariness. 59 As 
Thomas Walde and Borzu Sabahi rightly observed: 
Very little proper economic analysis has been carried out 
on the question of compensation in investment disputes. 
Nor have arbitral tribunals or the damages debate given 
much thought to it-partly because economic analysis of 
the larger impact of rules created by tribunals is at 
present still alien to both arbitrators and advocates, who 
mainly have a legal background.60 
Given the prevailing climate of uncertainty and marked 
impreCISIOn surrounding the methodology and design of 
appropriate compensation as reparations for investment treaty 
breaches and liquidated damages clauses in foreign investment 
contracts, Professor Sykes' insights on tort law-based 
59. See, e.g., Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor·State Arbitration: Toward A 
More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196, 214 (2012) ("Although investor· state 
decisions are moving toward better explanations of valuation, deficient discussions of 
specific calculations remain a common exception to the trend .... In most cases ... the 
failure to explain valuation adequately hints at a failure to address the issue methodically, 
thus exposing an award to greater skepticism." (footnotes omitted»; Charles N. Brower & 
Michael Ottolenghi, Damages in Investor·State Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 65, 67-68 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008) 
("[T)he distinction between 'damages' and 'compensation 0' [shows] terminological 
imprecision ... [T)he two terms are employed differently in the context of 
expropriations ... '[D]amages' are the remedy for unlawful State acts, while compensation 
is understood as a component oflawful behavior, for example as one of the conditions that 
render expropriations lawful." (footnotes omitted»; Diane A. Desierto, ICESCR Minimum 
Core Obligations and Investment: Recasting the Non·Expropriation Compensation Model 
During Financial Crises, 44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 473, 494 (2012) ("Although arbitral 
tribunals refer to the general law of international responsibility to determine 
compensation for breaches of non-expropriation standards in investment treaties, such as 
the FET standard, the valuation process has been inconsistent, especially when an 
economic emergency is at issue."); Lee A. O'Connor, Notes and Comments, The 
International Law of Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property: The Compensation 
Requirement and the Role of the Taking State, 6 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 355, 356 
(1983) ("[F]ull compensation is not currently, and indeed never was, the international 
standard .... [I)nternationallaw grants the primary responsibility of setting the amount 
of compensation to the taking state."). 
60. Thomas W. Walde & Borzu Sabahi, Compensation, Damages, and Valuation, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1049, 1054 (Peter 
Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
2016] MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF NECESSITY 735 
compensation for a tortfeasor's commission of an injurious act as 
a result of economic exigency, and on contract law-based 
expectation damages, provide useful initial conceptual guides for 
drafters of foreign investment contracts as well as investor-State 
arbitral tribunals.61 These proposals, however, require further 
detailed elaboration to fully assist host States, both in framing 
optimal liquidated damage clauses in their foreign investment 
contracts, as well as in arguing the appropriate valuation method 
of compensation in investment treaty-based arbitrations. 
Turning to Professor Sykes' proposal on using impossibility 
and commercial impracticability doctrines in contract law as 
possible paradigms for "economic necessity," it should be noted 
that these doctrines have already been considered for designing 
complex foreign investment contracts62 and have also been 
litigated as part of the host State's domestic contract law alleged 
to apply to foreign investment contracts in investor-State 
arbitration.63 Significantly, it has been reported that arbitral 
61. See Sykes, supra note 12, at 29S, 300 (explaining how tort and contract law 
principles influence how the concept of necessity can contribute to international 
investment law). For ongoing reform initiatives relating to foreign investment contracts 
and/or investor-State dispute processes, see LORENZO COTULA, INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SO-Sl (2010) (explaining that different international 
arbitration systems have reformed to improve transparency); STEPHAN W. SCHILL, 
REFORMING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1 (2015) (explaining that reform 
strategies have been contested because "different reform proposals often reflect different 
(political, ideological, or institutional) preferences that may not be globally shared"); and 
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, at lOS (2015), 
http://unctad.org/enlPublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf (explaining 50 countries have 
revised their lIAs to implement arbitration reforms). 
62. See FREDERICKR. FUCCI, HARDSHIP AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AS GROUNDS 
FOR ADJUSTMENT OR NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 10 (2006), http://www. 
arnoldporter.comlresources/documents/Hardship_Excuse_Artide. pdf (explaining most 
international investment agreements contain force majeure clauses that deal specifically 
with hardship); Erlend Bakken & Tonje P. Gormley, Using Dynamic Petroleum Contract 
Clauses to Manage Risk in Volatile Markets, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAw & POLICY 2009-2010, at 177, lSS-S9 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010) (describing how the 
contract principles such as rebus sic stantibus are used by drafters to combat 
impracticability). 
63. See, e.g., PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB102/5, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ~ S5 (June 4, 2004) (discussing an asserted domestic contract 
doctrine of impossibility); Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case 
No. ARBIOS/5, Decision on Liability, ~ 103 (Dec. 14, 2012) (discussing an asserted defense 
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tribunals are often not easily persuaded by impracticability and 
often require a difficult standard of proof. 64 Even in circumstances 
where a host State alleges some variant of change of 
circumstances under its domestic contract law (in response to an 
alleged contract breach elevated into an investment treaty breach 
due to an umbrella clause),65 arbitral tribunals have been advised 
to "apply strict scrutiny in order to delineate opportunistic 
behavior and good faith reaction to contingencies."66 For similar 
reasons on the threshold of proof required, doctrines in treaty law 
such as supervening impossibility of performance67 and 
fundamental change of circumstances68 have not been as 
frequently applied or often successfully invoked by States in 
international disputes.69 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the 
of rebus sic stantibus under domestic contract law); Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/9811, Award, ~ 25 (Sept. 18, 2000) (discussing a contract law doctrine 
of hardship and its consequences). 
64. See Mark Augenblick & Alison B. Rousseau, Force Majeure in Tumultuous 
Times: Impracticability as the New Impossibility, It's Not as Easy to Prove as You Might 
Believe, 13 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 59, 60 (2012) (stating that the current standard of 
impracticability is not easy to prove). 
65. See Stephan W. Schill, Umbrella Clauses as Public Law Concepts in 
Comparative Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC 
LAW 317,332-34 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010): 
The difference between preventing opportunistic behavior and the need to 
react flexibly to an unexpected change of circumstances can also be traced as 
a fundamental concern in virtually any domestic legal system. It is addressed 
by various concepts, including doctrines of clausula rebus sic stantibus, force 
majeure, impossibility, frustration, impn!vision, or the Lehre von der 
Geschaftsgrundlage, and accepted in countless domestic legal systems. 
Similarly, various projects of codification of principles of contract law and 
international private law, as well as numerous commercial arbitration 
awards, draw a distinction between opportunistic behavior and contingencies 
and accept that unforeseen contingencies allow, under certain circumstances, 
a departure from contractual obligations. 
(footnotes omitted). 
66. Id. at 336. 
67. VCLT, supra note 26, art. 6l. 
68. Id_ art. 62. 
69. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1973 LC.J. Rep. 49, ~~ 34, 
37, 40 (Feb. 2) (noting that a change of circumstances must be a significant one, and that 
the changes here were insufficient to effect the obligation to submit to the court's 
jurisdiction); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1973 LC.J. Rep. 3, ~~ 24-25 
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International Court of Justice explicitly rejected Hungary's 
assertion of profound political changes and economic exigencies, 
the diminished economic viability of the investment project, and 
the development of new environmental norms as constituting any 
fundamental change of circumstances as contemplated in VCLT 
Article 62.70 These contra indications from settled international 
arbitral and adjudicative practices militate heavily against 
relying on contract law doctrines of impossibility and commercial 
impracticability as possible defenses for States. 
Apart from tort law and contract law, Professor Sykes also 
points to adopting treaty language from world trade law into 
investment law, specifically safeguard measures in Article IX 
(Emergency Action on Imports), and exceptions clauses in Article 
XX (General Exceptions), Article XXI (Security Exceptions), and 
balance of payments clauses in Articles XII-XV in the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).71 Among the virtues he 
identifies from these clauses are: 
[1) as regards Article XXI] narrowly tailored security 
exceptions, limited on their face to circumstances that 
are well defined and observable, can function reasonably 
well, even when made self-judging. .. [2) as regards 
Article XX,] preserving a broad degree of policy 
sovereignty for members to pursue nontrade objectives, 
while ensuring that they do not deliberately or 
inadvertently impose excessive costs on trading 
partners ... [3) with respect to safeguard measures in 
Article XIX] permit [ting] WTO members to escape the 
economic consequences of negotiated import concessions 
that result in unexpected import surges that seriously 
imperil an import-competing industry [and such 
measures can be] efficient in a political sense [either 
(Feb. 2) (describing a situation in which an international court refused to accept an 
accusation of threat of force to contract due to issues of proof). As one commentator has 
observed, while virtually all international tribunals recognize fundamental change of 
circumstances as a defense, nearly none actually apply it. ~algosia Fitzmaurice, 
Exceptional Circumstances and Treaty Commitments, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 
605,612 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012). 
70. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.lSlovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 
'\I 104 (Sept. 25). 
71. Sykes, supra note 12, at 302-03,306-07. 
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because] it is in the parties' interest to permit temporary 
'cheating' to preserve long-term cooperation [or that the] 
safeguard mechanism ... makes politicians less skittish 
about negotiating trade concessions and leads to more 
concessions ex ante, even if some are temporarily 
revoked ex post [and 4) because economic exigencies] 
may at times arise because of balance-of-payments crises 
that threaten capital flight... [these] afford a 
justification from trade commitments in the WTO when 
they are properly linked to bona fide crises and properly 
time limited.72 
It should first be noted that GATT exceptions clauses and 
GATT-based balance of payments clauses are already present in 
several of the newer international investment treaties involving 
well-established regional trade groupings and economic 
partnerships,73 such as those of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN)74 and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).75 Investor-State arbitral tribunals have not 
72. Id. at 303·07. 
73. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY IN lIAS 86, 90, 92 (2009), http://unctad.org/enlDocs/diaeia20085_en.pdf 
(describing the general exceptions and security exceptions language found in ASEAN as 
similar to the exceptions language found in GAAT); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., 
supra note 61, at 116 (noting the effect of the use of GATT·based balance of payment 
regimes by international trade groups and partnerships). 
74. Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Assoc. of S.E. Asian Nations, art. 16, 
Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2013/economiclaia/ACIA_FinaLText_ 
26%20Feb%202009.pdf. See substantially similar, if not identical, language in the 
Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation, Assoc. of S.E. Asian Nations-S. Korea, art. 11, June 2, 2009, http://akfta. 
asean.orglindex.php?page=investment.legal·text (noting the similar language used in the 
Temporary Safeguard Measures clause); Agreement on Investment of the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, China-Assoc. ofS.E. Asian Nations, 
art. 11, Aug. 15, 2009, http://www.fta.gov.sg/acftalasean·china_inv_agreement(certified_ 
copy).pdf (noting the similar language in the Measures to Safeguard the Balance of 
Payments clause); Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, Assoc. of S.E. Asian Nations-India, art. 12, Oct. 8, 
2003, http://www .asean.org/wp-contentluploads/images/pdf/20 14_ upload! ASEAN -India % 
20Investment%20Agreement%20%20-%20Scanned%20ASEAN%20version.pdf 
(describing balance of payments in similar language). 
75. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2102, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
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yet had occasion to interpret these GATT-law based clauses, 
although various scholars have debated the merits and 
consequences of incorporating these kinds of clauses into 
international investment treaties.76 
While in principle nothing should prevent States from 
incorporating GATT-based clauses into their international 
investment treaties, it is important to differentiate the ideological 
paradigm and structural contexts that animate the centralized 
interpretation of GATT-based clauses under the WTO's 
adjudicative organs, as against those which exist under the 
dispersed constellation of thousands of differently-worded 
investment treaties that are individually interpreted by various 
investor-State arbitral tribunals with no centralized appellate 
mechanism.77 In the first place, because world trade agreements 
are premised on ensuring continued nondiscriminatory reciprocal 
market access between States, the remedies and defenses to 
breaches of these agreements primarily involve calibration and 
adjustment of governmental measures. When a WTO Member 
76. See Levent Sabanogullari, The Merits and Limitations of General Exception 
Clauses in Contemporary Investment Treaty Practice, INV. TREATY NEWS (May 21,2015), 
https:l!www.iisd.org/itnl2015/05/211the-merits-and-limitations-of-general-exception-
clauses-in-contemporary-investment-treaty-practice/#_ednrem (noting that the benefits of 
general exception clauses in lIAs provide enhanced regulatory flexibility and increased 
legal certainty in investment arbitration, that the main risks include abusive invocations, 
and that the rigidity of the new exceptions will actually limit or have no effect on the 
existing flexibility); Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment 
Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 351, 357, 360 
(Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011) (debating the inclusion of GATT-based 
general exceptions clauses and arguing that their existence brings too much uncertainty 
to the system); Celine Levesque, The Inclusion of GATT XX Exceptions in lIAs: A 
Potentially Risky Policy, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw AND POLICY 
363, 370 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauve eds., 2013) (debating the role that general 
exceptions clauses play in international investment law and concluding that their role is 
limited and that they do not modify the obligation of states to compensate in cases of 
takings); Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing the 
Concept of "Necessity" in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
93, 138, 145 (2013) (assessing the advantages and disadvantages of applying WTO-based 
necessity clauses to lIAs). 
77. See Desierto, supra note 8, at 115-16, 116 n.271 (describing the lack of a 
centralized appellate mechanism as leading to uncertainty in future interpretation of 
GATT based clauses, due to the fact that each State's own interpretive regime will produce 
differing results). 
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State violates world trade law guarantees in any of its numerous 
multilateral treaties, the reparative sanction primarily imposed 
by the WTO adjudicative organs is to require the breaching 
Member's cessation of the violation with an order to bring its 
offending measure into compliance, coupled with the future 
possibility of imposing sanctions on the non-complying WTO 
Member by authorizing other WTO Members to take 
countermeasures or retaliatory actions against it to the extent of 
the assessed market access injury.78 Cases at the WTO are 
brought by States seeking the WTO Member's adjustment or 
elimination of its challenged governmental measure precisely to 
restore the balance of mutually guaranteed foreign market access 
designed and contemplated in the WTO agreements. Repeat 
interpretive practices by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (the 
adjudicative hat of the same WTO membership that wears its 
political hat through the WTO General Council) have lent more 
predictability and a greater sense (if not actual evidence) of a 
jurisprudence constante in WTO law.79 
78. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 19, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)) 
(giving authority to adjudicatory bodies to bring inconsistent measures into compliance 
and stating that when an adjudicatory body finds "a measure is inconsistent with a covered 
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into 
conformity with that agreement"); see also Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO 
Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EuR. J. INT'L L. 763, 777·78 (2000) 
(describing article 19 of the DSU as following a two· tiered approach which first imposes 
an obligation on all WTO adjudicating bodies to recommend that WTO measures have not 
been in conformity, and second, gives those bodies the opportunity to suggest ways in 
which WTO members could bring their measures into compliance with their international 
obligations); Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and 
Trade Law Enforcement, 80 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 102, 108·10 (2011) ("One of the major 
innovations of the World Trade Organization's ("WTO") Dispute Settlement 
Understanding [supra) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade 
law."); Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITI'. L. 
REV. 763, 777·81 (2004) (describing the suspension of the concessions remedy under the 
DSU as the icon of the new WTO system in that such teeth provide an operable threat 
deterring future violations). 
79. See ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE 
BODY 197 (2009) (noting that predictability in the system originates from the emergence 
of a coherent body of case law, interpreting similar or identical treaty text, from a 
permanent dispute settlement system); David Unterhalter, The Authority of an 
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Investment treaty-based disputes, on the other hand, are not 
initiated between States under the investor-State dispute 
settlement mechanism created in international investment 
treaties. The object of this system is not to seek reparative 
adjustment of a challenged governmental measure, but to 
establish compensatory redress as the usual form of reparations 
for foreign investors that have already incurred economic injury, 
as a result of the challenged governmental measure breaching 
investment treaty standards of protection owed to such foreign 
investors.80 States created the benefit of enabling their 
investor-nationals to directly resort to investor-State dispute 
settlement mechanisms against host States of investment that 
injure the economic value of their investment, because of the 
historically demonstrated tendency towards mass expropriations 
or erosions of foreign capital when investor protections are left 
solely to the self-interested discretion of political elites in host 
States,81 as well as the threat (actual or perceived) of the lack of 
impartiality of host State tribunals when foreign investors seek 
economIC recovery from such tribunals.82 The atomized 
interpretation of numerous investment treaty standards by 
different investor-State arbitral tribunals results in diffuse and 
decentralized investment law-making and interpretation, in 
Institution: The Appellate Body Under Review, in A HISTORY OF LAw AND LAWYERS IN THE 
GATTfWTO 466, 472-75 (Gabrielle Marceau ed., 2015) (noting that interpretive practices 
administered by the dispute settlement body were enacted to provide security and 
predictability to WTO law). 
80. See Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
art. 36 cmt, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.B/25 (2012) (illustrating the similar views of various 
international tribunals that damages for international wrongful conduct in violation of 
investment treaties or trade agreements is purely compensatory in function, directly 
emphasizing the right of a state that has suffered measurable, repressible economic injury 
to be made whole, and wholly foregoing focus on correction of the wrongful state action 
that purportedly caused that injury). 
81. See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
(2010) (discussing at great length the history of treatment by sovereigns of foreign 
investors, the associated impacts of World War II, the Great Depression, the spread of 
communism, and the resurgence of globalization culminating in the evolution of 
multilateral investment agreements, NAFTA and the WTO). 
82. Christoph Schreuer, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in LoOKING TO THE 
FUTURE 787, 787-88 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011). 
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stark contrast to the more coordinative processes between the 
political and legal organs of the WTO system.83 
Given these differences, Professor Sykes' proposal to graft 
GATT-based clauses into international investment system needs 
considerably more analysis and deeper research into possible 
evolutions of the structural design of the international 
investment dispute settlement system. Purposely incorporating 
GATT-based exceptions into the language of international 
investment treaties may indeed create treaty-based pathways for 
host States to assert wider spaces for regulatory justification, but, 
left uncontrolled, they could also incentivize pretextual or morally 
hazardous conduct by States (especially those asserting the 
'self-judged' nature of these exceptions or relying on the absence 
of settled jurisprudence constante among investor-State arbitral 
tribunals), enabling political elites in these host States to exact 
greater leverage in purposely inflicting greater economic injuries 
against foreign investors - noting that their challenged 
regulatory actions cannot be reversed as would ordinarily be the 
case for offending governmental measures under the WTO 
system. Even worse, introducing such ambiguous language in 
investment treaties could potentially spell the difference in 
foreign investors' evaluation of available legal protections 
between competing jurisdictions.84 Reforming the international 
83. DIANE A. DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 316 
(2015). 
84. It is of course well known that the precise 'incentivizing' or 'disincentivizing' 
effects of investment treaties on actual foreign investment capital inflows remains much 
debated among scholars. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, in THE EFFECT OF 
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 225, 225-26 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs 
eds., 2009) (suggesting that, while evidence is inconclusive, the effects of BITs on flow of 
foreign-direct investment are unpredictable and minor as compared to the tremendous 
risk and effort they incur); Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra, at 253, 253-55 (acknowledging the foregoing viewpoint, but 
finding empirical support for a significant and positive impact of BITs); Mary 
Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit . .. and 
They Could Bite, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra, at 
349, 350-51, 374-75 (suggesting that "BITs act as more of a complement to than a 
substitute for domestic institutions," and that those benefiting from BITs actually need 
them the least). 
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investment system to recalibrate possible defenses to justify host 
States' regulatory actions ultimately requires more than just the 
incremental infusion of certain clauses into international 
investment treaties. Rather, more strategic, institutional, and 
thoughtful normative rethinking should be made on the actual 
nature and (the possibly narrower) justifiable scope of reparations 
that ought to be afforded to foreign investors in international 
investment law, also giving due consideration to the changing 
configurations between the traditional and new players (capital 
recipients and capital exporters alike) in the postmodern 
international economic system.85 
III. LIMITS TO REINTERPRETING TREATy-BASED NECESSITY 
This article's main point of divergence from Professor Sykes' 
proposals lies with his proposals to reinterpret pre-existing 
necessity clauses in various international investment treaties, 
such as in the case of Article XI of the bilateral investment treaty 
between the United States and Argentina (U.S.-Argentina BIT),86 
which has been litigated extensively in concluded and pending 
investor-State arbitrations.87 Quoting in more detail from 
Professor Sykes' article: 
An adjudicator can defer to a nation claiming necessity 
or a similar defense (such as that under Article XI of the 
85. DIANE A. DESIERTO, REPARATIONS IN POSTMODERN INTERNATIONAL LAw: 
PROPORTIONALITY, EQUITY, AND JUSTICE (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
86. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection ofInvestment art. XI, Nov. 14, 
1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT] ("This Treaty shall not preclude the 
application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the 
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests."). 
87. For relevant case law on Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, see infra notes 
91-92. The author's analysis of Article XI is laid out in more detail in DESIERTO, supra note 
14, at 158-59, 170-71 (discussing States' use of the concept of emergency as revealed 
through analysis of international investment tribunal jurisprudence); Desierto, supra note 
36, at 827-28 (arguing that customary doctrine on necessity has no interpretive utility for 
Article XI, and that a State invoking Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT does so only to 
address international responsibility vis-a-vis the other State Party to this treaty, and that 
it cannot use Article XI to remove lex specialis substantive duties under the BIT to that 
State Party's investors). 
744 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38:3 
US-Argentina BIT) but require that a measure of 
compensation be paid for the harm done due to breach of 
international obligations. The compensation can be 
deferred until such time as a state claiming necessity has 
recovered from the emergency situation sufficiently to be 
in a position to compensate without impairing its 
essential interests ... an arbitral tribunal applying the 
necessity defense under elL has the discretion to rule 
that compensation is required, at least after the period 
of necessity abates. 
In my view, Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT can be 
construed in this manner as well. Consider the phrase 
'this treaty shall not preclude the application by either 
party of measures necessary' to maintain public order or 
protect an essential security interest. If a measure such 
as the suspension of dollar pricing and indexing in 
Argentina is 'necessary: the treaty shall not preclude it. 
But once the measure is taken, the treaty is arguably 
silent on the question of compensation. Only if a 
compensation requirement would itself 'preclude' a 
'necessary' measure does the text seem to rule out 
compensation. It is difficult to imagine why a 
requirement of compensation, deferred until such time 
as the exigent circumstances abate and the nation has 
the resources to compensate, and appropriately limited 
in magnitude, would be preclusive.88 
While there is little doubt that States can suspend obligations 
towards investors (including duties to compensate investors) in 
applicable states of necessity under Article 25 in relation to 
Article 27 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 89 it is 
not at all immediately evident nor apparent that this is the exact 
same meaning and consequence provided for and actually 
88. Sykes, supra note 12, at 320-21 (emphasis added). 
89. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 16, arts. 25, 27 & cmt. ("[I]nvocation of 
[necessity pursuant to Article 25] ... is without prejudice to ... compliance with the 
obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
no longer exists .... ") (emphasis added); see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Economic Security 
Defenses in International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAw & POLICY 2008-2009, at 479,479-80 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009) ("It is uncontroversial 
that in certain circumstances [including, inter alia, Article 25 'necessity' and 
'circumstances precluding wrongfulness,] a State may be excused from its obligations."). 
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intended under the brief one sentence of Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT.9o It is also not at all clear what Professor 
Sykes intends as the actual effect of preclusion, particularly as it 
relates to the alleged liability of a host State taking such a 
measure 'necessary' for essential security interests but which 
causes economic injury to investors. If a "treaty shall not preclude 
a measure," could the measure at issue still be deemed to breach 
any other investment protection standards in the treaty as to give 
rise to the investor's second-order claim of reparations (usually in 
the form of compensation)? Avoidance of any breach in the first 
instance (e.g. necessity as a first-order justification preventing 
any breach of the investment treaty from arising) is the 
interpretation Argentina has advanced (and continues to 
advance) in numerous cases a position which has been largely 
rejected by the majority of arbitral tribunals,91 and accepted 
90. See U.S.·Argentina BIT, supra note 86, art. XI (''This Treaty shall not preclude 
the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, 
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests."). 
91. Jose E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental 
Casualty v. Argentina, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw AND POLICY 
2010-2011, 319-375 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011); see National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentina, 
Award, UNCITRAL, ~~ 251-57, 260-62 (Nov. 3, 2008) (finding that Argentina's 
contribution to its own state of necessity precluded its successful invocation of the defense, 
but noting that, even ifit were available, the defense would "only ... be available to excuse 
non-performance," not damages resulting from its actions taken during the state of 
necessity) (emphasis added); EDF Int'l S.A. et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, 
Award, ~~ 1177-78 (June 11, 2012) ("[E)ven if Respondent's conduct might be excused 
under the State of Necessity Defense, Respondent remains obligated to return to the 
pre-necessity status quo when possible. Moreover, the successful invocation of the 
necessity defense does not per se preclude payment of compensation to the injured investor 
for any damage suffered as a result of the necessity measures enacted by the State."); Suez 
et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ~~ 249, 258, 265 
(July 30, 2010) (rejecting Argentina's plea of necessity and noting that the strict limits on 
the availability of the defense exist because "given the frequency of crises and emergencies 
that nations ... face from time to time, to allow them to escape their treaty obligations 
would threaten the very fabric of international law and indeed the stability of the system 
of international relations"); EI Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic, ~~ 189, 203 (Sept. 22, 2014) (refusing to find reversible error by the 
Tribunal in finding that, because Article XI was applicable, no inquiry was necessary as 
to the availability of the state of necessity defense); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ~~ 344, 356-59, 361 (June 21, 2011) (denying Argentina's 
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(partially or completely) by a few. 92 
Alternatively, however, it might also appear from Professor 
Sykes' proposal that a State invoking such a clause would not be 
prevented from taking any such measure subsumed therein even 
when the same facially violates any other investment treaty 
standards, subject to a compensation requirement that "can 
induce a state that deviates from its international obligations to 
'internalize' a substantial portion of the cost."93 Somewhat 
nebulously, Professor Sykes avers that compensation will itself be 
ruled out "if the compensation requirement would itself 'preclude' 
necessity defense plea after finding that, inter alia, long-term fiscal mismanagement by 
successive economic regimes substantially contributed to the situation of necessity); BG 
Group_ v_ Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ~~ 407-09, 412 (Dec_ 24, 2007) (rejecting 
Argentina's defense of necessity and finding that even if "necessity were to justify some 
fair and non-discriminatory measure by Argentina, an obligation to compensate would still 
obtain by virtue of the BIT"); Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No_ ARB/01/3, Award, ~~ 333-34, 339 (May 22, 2007) (finding "that the crisis invoked 
[by Argentina did] not meet the customary law requirements of Article 25 of the Articles 
on State Responsibility, [and] thus concluding that necessity or emergency are not 
conducive to the preclusion of wrongfulness"); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01l8, Award, ~'i1 367,373,380,382 (May 12, 2005) ("Even if the plea 
of necessity were accepted, compliance with the obligation would reemerge as soon as the 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness no longer existed, which is the case at present."). 
Note that the tribunal did not reach a finding on the issue of necessity, since the claimant 
was unable to prove liability for damages in the first instance in Metalpar S.A. & Buen 
Aire S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5, Award on the Merits, 'iI~ 208, 211 
(June 6, 2008). 
92. LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on 
Liability, 'iI~ 263-64 (Oct. 3, 2006) (finding that Argentina was not liable for damages 
incurred during the state of necessity); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/9, Award, ~~ 231-33, 236 (Sept. 5, 2008) (finding that Argentina properly invoked 
Article XI of the BIT and did not, as a result, breach any other investment treaty standard 
of protection owed to investors); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. 
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01l3, Decision on Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic, ~~ 356, 405-06 (July 30, 2010) (finding that the arbitral tribunal 
committed annuli able error by failing to state reasons with regard to its Article XI analysis 
as well as its analysis of state of necessity under Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Decision on the Argentine Republic'~ Request for Annulment of the Award, ~~ 209, 217-19 
(June 29, 2010) (finding that the arbitral tribunal committed manifest excess of powers 
when it failed to apply the applicable law under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT). 
93. Sykes, supra note 12, at 321. 
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a 'necessary' measure,"94 without explaining how, and under what 
circumstances, that preclusion would occur and whether that 
effect of preclusion is justified. Would this mean, for example, 
that if an investment treaty standard (such as expropriation) 
itself provides for a compensation requirement (usually the Hull 
standard of full, adequate, and prompt compensation contained 
in many investment treaty provisions on expropriation),95 that a 
State contemplating an expropriatory measure, but finding such 
compensation costs to be too prohibitive as to deter taking that 
measure, can nevertheless forego paying such compensation 
when it makes a case that the measure is 'necessary' under the 
terminology of Article XI? The clear danger to these a priori 
meanings attached to Article XI-type clauses written ex post in 
current investment treaties is that the very same ambiguity on 
the effect and consequences of 'preclusion' could very well create 
and incentivize the moral hazards and opportunistic behavior of 
States that Professor Sykes seeks to avoid. 
In writing new exceptions clauses in future investment 
treaties or even adapting or reformulating current exceptions 
clauses when renegotiating current investment treaties, one can 
certainly be sympathetic to, if not agree with, Professor Sykes' 
advice - based on Article 27 of the ILC Draft Articles on the 
limited effect of suspension of obligations for circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness - that there should indeed be a 
possibility for States to defer payment of compensation in times 
of economic emergency or exigency until such emergency has 
abated and the nation has regained resources to compensate, and 
that such compensation should only be appropriately limited in 
magnitude.96 Professor Sykes does not elaborate on the actual 
operational criteria to determine: 1) the definition of the 
94. [d. 
95. See a survey of such expropriation clauses containing just compensation 
requirements in different treaties in 2 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., EXPROPRIATION: 
UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 40, 42-43 
(2012), http://unctad.org/enlDocs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (briefly describing the 
elements of the Hull standard of compensation and surveying the expropriation clauses of 
various treaties containing similar just compensation requirements). 
96. Sykes, supra note 12, at 323. 
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'economic exigency'97 that qualifies, in his view, to justify a State 
taking measures that purposely injure investors' property 
interests and rights; 2) the alleged termination point of the 
'economic exigency' and the point of resource sufficiency for the 
host State that would justify resume paying compensation to 
investors (and when these payments can be feasibly made given 
all competing claims against a State's resources at any point in 
time, but especially more so in the reconstruction aftermath of 
economic crises);98 and 3) the actual appropriate scale and level of 
compensation, and the permissible and legitimate valuation 
method to assess that compensation.99 These are all hard and 
interrelated policy, fact, and legal questions that cannot be easily 
put to the resolution of investor-State arbitral tribunals on a 
case-to-case basis, and by inducing results through a forced 
reinterpretation of pre-existing necessity clauses such as Article 
XI ofthe u.S.-Argentina BIT. These are complex and challenging 
policy reform issues for investment treaty drafters and 
negotiators to begin with that require tremendous research, 
stakeholder consultation, and intergovernmental 
decision-making. Arbitral tribunals with their limited mandates 
to resolve investor-State disputes should not be expected to 
legislate these questions for States through their arbitral 
decisions, especially given the uncertain vagaries of available 
evidence and litigation strategies deployed by parties in 
97. As I have shown in previous work, even the very definition of 'economic 
emergencies' - what they are, when they arise, and when they terminate - does not have 
any clear consensus among security experts and economists. DESIERTO, supra note 14, at 
145-49. 
98. Evidently, at any given point, a State faces innumerable demands on its fiscal 
resources and the normative allocation and ordering of these resources to serve basic needs 
of its populations as well as service external debts to creditors. See JEROME B. MCKINNEY, 
EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT AGENCIES 540 (4th ed. 
2015) ("[F]iscal solvency means the provision of services at a level and with the amount of 
benefits that are adequate, equitable and stable .... [A]dequacy [means] suggesting the 
sufficiency of goods and services to maintain individual well-being; equity [means] 
guaranteeing equal access and opportunity to benefits from goods and services; and 
stability [means] referring to the maintenance of goods and services commensurate with 
the needs and expectations of citizens." (internal quotation marks omitted». 
99. See generally MARK KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION (2008) (explaining 
the broad spectrum of valuation approaches available). 
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individual investor-State arbitrations that can realistically limit 
how such questions are framed, analyzed, and resolved. 
The main difficulty with superimposing these innovations 
into the interpretation of pre-existing necessity clauses such as 
Article XI ofthe U.S.-Argentina BIT is not so much that it utterly 
reinvents the wheel, so much as it introduces too many sudden 
new 'spokes' to it that could well jeopardize the intentions and 
expectations of State parties that concluded this treaty. There is 
nothing in the language of Article XI that encapsulates the effect 
of suspension of obligations (including compensation) that 
Professor Sykes seems to prefer, and there is likewise nothing in 
that same language that regulates the issue of compensation as a 
mode of reparations for breaches of investment treaties. There is 
a reason why the interpretation of Article XI has spilled so much 
ink among international legal scholars and remains much 
contested in pending investor-State disputes. On the one hand, as 
Argentina has repeatedly argued,lOO this provision could well be 
the basis for preventing any breach of the investment treaty from 
arising in the first place, thus nullifying any investor's right to 
claim reparations (in the form of compensation) for the 
investment treaty breach under international law. On the other 
hand, giving full rein to States to cherry-pick which investment 
treaty provisions it will be bound to, subject only to its own 
appreciation of what "essential security interests" are served by 
measures that deliberately injure if not eliminate investors' 
economic interests, is the beginning of the slippery slope to the 
rule of the exception in international law. Neither of these 
consequences can be funy desirable to the State and non-State 
actors who all use the protections, guarantees, and incentives 
fostered under the international investment treaty system to 
their respective political and economic advantage. 
Leaving the issue of Article XI aside, however, there is much 
to be gained by arbitral tribunals from Professor Sykes' proposal 
on the compensation requirement. Compensation as a mode of 
reparations for breach of investment treaties to date remains 
100. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSm Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 'Il'll 84, 86 
(Sept. 5, 2008) (arguing if Article XI is applicable, no compensation is due because there 
is no treaty violation). 
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undertheorized. 101 Investor-State arbitral tribunals stand quite 
idiosyncratically among international tribunals in the frequency 
and high degree of compensation awards that they can issue for 
breach of investment treaty protection guarantees. One need only 
recall that the International Court of Justice's Diallo judgment 
strictly regulated the proof and evidentiary matters in its 
compensation phase.102 Investment treaty breaches have gained 
interesting fame (if not some notoriety) for the ability of foreign 
investors to recover full fair market value compensation, in 
contrast to the limited ability of civilian populations to obtain full 
economic redress in times of armed conflict for violations of the 
laws of war that result in total property destruction, cultural 
devastation, or environmental harm.I03 As a mode of reparations, 
compensation is supposed to "cover any financially assessable 
101. See Ligia Catherine Arias-Barrera, Lack of Definition of Compensation in 
International Investment Disputes for Non-Expropriation Claims: Is There an Appropriate 
Mechanism to Determine It?, 10 REVISTA MERCATORIA 75, 89-91 (2011) (discussing the 
different approaches tribunals have taken in determining full compensation as a mode of 
reparations); Kaj Hober, Remedies in Investment Disputes, in 3 INVESTMENT TREATY LAw 
3, 10 (Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. eds., 2009) (highlighting the two situations compensation 
has been used in arbitration: expropriation and violations of fair and equitable treatment); 
Diane A. Desierto, Contract, Governance, or a 'Public Private Partnership' Lens? 
Methodological Consequences in International Investment Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 2014 (August Reinisch et al. eds., 2016) 
(forthcoming). 
102. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012 LC.J. 
Rep. 325, ~ 61 (June 19) (fIxing the amount of compensation for Mr. Diallo's non-material 
injury at US$85,000, with the compensation for his material injury in relation to his 
personal property at $10,000, and rejecting claims for compensation based on alleged 
material injury due to loss of professional remuneration during his detentions and 
following his unlawful expulsion). 
103. See generally CRISTIAN CORREA, INTEGRATING DEVELOPMENT AND 
REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF MASSIVE CRIMES (2014), http://humanrights.nd.edul 
assets/136618/correareparations2.pdf (addressing the need for varying approaches beyond 
monetary compensation for mass crimes and international law violations); U.N. ENV'T 
PROGRAMME, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT 50 (2009) 
(addressing the obstacles of civilian populations to recover full economic redress for 
violations of the laws of war); Roger O'Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 492, 502 (Andrew 
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014) (discussing how, after World Wars I and II, various 
treaties required countries to give restitution for having taken or destroyed another 
country's cultural property). 
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damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established," and 
only to the extent that damage is not made good by restitution. 104 
Such compensation is "not concerned to punish the responsible 
State, nor does compensation have an expressive or exemplary 
character. .. [while] it generally consists of a monetary 
payment ... it may sometimes take the form, as agreed of other 
forms of value."105 The International Law Commission stressed 
that the quantification of compensable damage would depend 
"upon the content of particular primary obligations, an evaluation 
of the respective behavior of the parties, and, more generally, a 
concern to reach an equitable and acceptable outcome."106 Thus 
far, investor-State arbitral tribunals by and large have not yet 
elucidated clear standards or methods for quantification of 
compensable damage as a mode of reparations, which do address 
the concern of reaching equitable and acceptable outcomes for 
both investors and States alike.107 
Professor Sykes rightly points out certain considerations that 
should be taken into account when designing appropriate 
compensation requirements that enable States to internalize 
some portion of the risk for acts taken in situations of economic 
necessity.108 Prevailing challenges to valuation issues over 
compensation (especially for breaches of investment treaty 
standards other than expropriation, such as the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, which do not usually expressly stipulate a 
compensation standard as in expropriation) cannot be neglected. 
Excessive 'reliance' investments by investors may occur as a 
104. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 16, art. 36. 
105. Id. art. 36, cmt. 4. 
106. Id. art. 36, cmt. 7. 
107. But see Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 
Decision on Annulment of the Award, ~ 272 (Nov. 2, 2015) (finding investors are bound 
only by compensation rules in the treaty of the state they are engaged with); Diane A. 
Desierto, Beneficial Ownership and International Claims for Economic Damage: 
Occidental Petroleum v. Ecuador and Restoring Limits to Investor-State Arbitral 
Tribunals' Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, EJIL (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
beneficial-ownership-and-international-claims-for-economic-damage-restoring-limits-to· 
investor-state-arbitral-tribunals-jurisdiction· in -occidental-petroleum -v-ecuadorl 
(discussing the clear limits the committee in the above decision placed on compensation in 
investor-state claims). 
108. Sykes, supra note 12, at 321-23. 
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result of the expectation that State would indeed pay some degree 
of compensation for acts that infringe investor protections during 
economic emergencies. Political elites in host State governments 
who make the decisions to deliberately breach investment 
treaties and just pay compensation to foreign investors cannot 
necessarily be assumed to be making efficient choices that are 
socially beneficial to the citizens of the host State, nor choices that 
are ultimately responsible to the host State's investment partners 
in foreign investors. Beyond these rational choice theory 
considerations and utilitarian intuitions, however, more remains 
to be done - engaging both the empirical techniques and tools 
available under discipline of economics as well as other social 
science methods - to start giving real flesh by way of scientific 
method and normative content to the International Law 
Commission's VISIOn of an "equitable and acceptable" 
compensation quantum to all parties in international disputes. 109 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Professor Sykes' proposal for examining various models of 
economic exigency in tort law, contract law, and trade law has 
particular resonance and relevance in the continuing dialogue to 
reform international investment law, especially through the 
writing of new exceptions clauses in international investment 
treaties. The economic rationales for the particular form of an 
economic exception in either tort law, contract law, or trade law 
are by no means uniform, and they have respectively been shaped 
by repeated judicial and arbitral dialogue in each of these 
spheres. This is not to say that the juxtaposition of "economic 
necessity" from these models is impossible or lacks salience to the 
discipline of international investment law. Rather, it is critical 
that any attempt to infuse insights and institutional experiences 
from the former legal regimes must also take into account their 
ultimate suitability to the latter legal regime and its own evolving 
institutions and jurisprudence. It is always tempting to draw 
doctrinal parallelisms when textual similarities appear, and in 
that sense, it is altogether legitimate for investment law's 
109. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 16, art. 36, cmt. 7. 
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authoritative rule-makers to examine, test, and possibly 
incorporate these doctrinal transplants as innovations to 
international investment law. It is an entirely different matter, 
however, to instantiate "economic necessity" doctrines developed 
in other regimes into a forced reading of pre-existing (and briefly 
worded) necessity clauses such as Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT. This article, on this front alone and on the basis of the 
unitary system of interpretation under VCLT Article 31, does not 
share Professor Sykes' positional rereading of this particular 
necessity clause. 
However, Professor Sykes' most valuable contribution to the 
evolution of the concept of "economic necessity," at least for 
international investment law, is his insight into the functions and 
limitations of compensation requirements as a mode of cost 
internalization for States. Given the continuing tension of 
navigating the threat of opportunistic behavior, pretextual or 
morally hazardous conduct by host States that could take 
advantage of very broadly-drawn exceptions clauses in 
investment treaties, Professor Sykes provides good conceptual 
parameters to guide tribunals in their assessment of 
compensation for investment treaty breaches. Thus far, most 
investor-State arbitral tribunals have not significantly dealt with 
the possibilities of deferring compensation or accepting other 
reparative modalities or forms apart from strict compensation 
such as, for example, legally preferential advantages in 
governmental contracts and processes, granting tax benefits and 
other non-monetary economic benefits in lieu of upfront 
compensation payments to investors, among others. Professor 
Sykes' rational choice-driven analyses of expectation damages 
and compensation provokes a more thorough future stream of 
research on redesigning compensation as a mode of reparations 
in international investment law. 
Finally, perhaps recognizing the futility of including 
"economic necessity" provisions, it is significant that the 
investment chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
AgreementllO does not contain any explicit exceptions clause 
110. TRANS·PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 47, ch. 9. 
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modeled after GATT exceptions such as GATT Article XX or XXI. 
Instead, this chapter provides for a denial of benefits clauselll as 
well as explicit provisions on corporate social responsibility, 
investment, environmental, health, and other regulatory 
objectives.1l2 This signals, at the very least, a marked discomfort 
on the part of States comprising around forty percent of the 
world's economy1l3 with the ambiguity and moral hazard costs 
associated with current forms of economic necessity provisions in 
investment treaties. Neither does an "economic necessity" 
provision appear resonant or significant in current debates on the 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.1l4 There is 
breathing space to judiciously plan a reformulation and 
recalibration of "economic necessity" and its functions, purposes, 
and consequences for international investment law, in a manner 
that engages, but also transcends, the rationalist assumptions 
and empirical applications of law and economics to international 
law. 
111. Id. art. 9.14. 
112. Id. arts. 9.15·.16. 
113. See Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., https:/I 
ustr.govltpp/overview-of-the-TPP (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (stating that the parties to the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership "representO nearly 40 percent of global GDP"). 
114. For an example of economic necessity not being discussed as an issue related to 
the TTIP see EU to Pursue the Most Ambitious Sustainable Development, Labour and 
Environment Provisions in ITIP, EUR. COMMISSION (Nov. 6, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa. 
eu/doclib/presslindex.cfm?id=1393. For an example of economic necessity only receiving 
one line of attention in an article on the TTIP, see Axel Berger, The Transatlantic Free 
Trade Agreement - The Dispute Over Dispute Settlement, GER. DEV. INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.die-gdi.de/enlthe-current-columnlarticlelthe·transatlantic-free-trade-
agreement-the-dispute-over-dispute-settlementl. 
